CATHOLIC VICAR APOSTOLIC vs CA G.R. No. 80294-95

CATHOLIC VICAR APOSTOLIC vs CA 

[G.R. No. 80294-95; September 21, 1988] 

GANCAYCO, J.

FACTS:

• Catholic Vicar of the Mountain Province (Vicar for brevity) filed with the CFI of Baguio, Benguet an application for registration of title for Lots 1,2,3 and 4 of Psu-194357 situated at Poblacion Central, La Trinidad, Benguet. Said lots being the sites of the Catholic Church building, convents, school, etc.
• Upon learning of the application, the Heirs of Juan Valdez and the Heirs of Emigdio Octaviano filed an Answer/Opposition thereto on Lots 2 and 3,respectively, asserting ownership and title thereto.  
• The land registration court promulgated its decision confirming the registrable title to Vicar. Both heirs of Valdez and Octaviano appealed to the Court of Appeals.
• The CA modified the decision of the land registration court and found that Lots 2 and 3 were possessed by the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents under claim of ownership in good faith from 1906 to 1951; that Vicar has been in possession of the same lots as bailee in commodatum up to 1951, when Vicar repudiated the trust and when it applied for registration in1962; that Vicar had just been in possession as owner for 11years, hence there is no possibility of acquisitive prescription which requires 10 years possession with just title and 30 years possession without.
• The appellate court did not believe the findings of the trial court that Lot 2 was acquired from Juan Valdez by purchase and Lot 3 was acquired also by purchase from Egmidio Octaviano by petitioner Vicar because there was absolutely no documentary evidence to support the same and the alleged purchases were never mentioned in the application for registration.

ISSUE:  WON petitioner Vicar's failure to return the subject property to private respondents would constitute an adverse possession that would entitle Vicar to have a just title over the questioned lots.

RULING:

• Private respondents were able to prove that their predecessors' house was borrowed by petitioner Vicar after the church and the convent were destroyed. They never asked for the return of the house, but when they allowed its free use, they became bailors in commodatum and the petitioner the bailee.
• The bailees' failure to return the subject matter of commodatum to the bailor did not mean adverse possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee held in trust the property subject matter of commodatum.
• The adverse claim of petitioner came only in 1951 when it declared the lots for taxation purposes. The action of petitioner Vicar by such adverse claim could not ripen into title by way of ordinary acquisitive prescription because of the absence of just title.
•  The Court found that the predecessors-in-interest and private respondents were possessors under claim of ownership in good faith from 1906; that petitioner Vicar was only a bailee in commodatum; and that the adverse claim and repudiation of trust came only in 1951.

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REPUBLIC VS BAGTAS G.R. No. L-17474

REPUBLIC VS BAGTAS 

[G.R. No. L-17474  October 25, 1962] 

PADILLA, J.

FACTS:

• Jose Bagtas borrowed from the Bureau of Animal Industry three bulls for a period of one year for breeding purposes subject to a government charge of breeding fee of 10% of the book value of the books.
• Upon the expiration of the contract, Bagtas asked for a renewal for another one year, however, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources approved only the renewal for one bull and other two bulls be returned.
• Bagtas then wrote a letter to the Director of  Animal Industry that he would pay the value of the three bulls with a deduction of yearly depreciation. The Director advised him that the value cannot be depreciated and asked Bagtas to either return the bulls or pay their book value.
• Bagtas neither paid nor returned the bulls. The Republic then commenced an action against Bagtas ordering him to return the bulls or pay their book value.
• After hearing, the trial Court ruled in favor of the Republic, as such, the Republic moved ex parte for a writ of execution which the court granted.
• Felicidad Bagtas, the surviving spouse and administrator of Bagtas’ estate, returned the two bulls and filed a motion to quash the writ of execution since one bull cannot be returned for it was killed by gunshot during a Huk raid. The Court denied her motion hence, this appeal certified by the Court of Appeals because only questions of law are raised.

ISSUE: WON the contract was commodatum;thus, Bagtas be held liable for its loss due to force majeure. 

RULING:

• A contract of commodatum is essentially gratuitous. Supreme Court held that Bagtas was liable for the loss of the bull even though it was caused by a fortuitous event.
• If the contract was one of lease, then the 10% breeding charge is compensation (rent) for the use of the bull and Bagtas, as lessee, is subject to the responsibilities of a possessor. He is also in bad faith because he continued to possess the bull even though the term of the contract has already expired.
• If the contract was one of commodatum, he is still liable because: (1) he kept the bull longer than the period stipulated; and (2) the thing loaned has been delivered with appraisal of its value (10%). No stipulation that in case of loss of the bull due to fortuitous event the late husband of the appellant would be exempt from liability.
• The original period of the loan was from 8 May 1948 to 7 May 1949. The loan of one bull was renewed for another period of one year to end on 8 May 1950. But the appellant kept and used the bull until November 1953 when during a Huk raid it was killed by stray bullets. 
• Furthermore, when lent and delivered to the deceased husband of the appellant the bulls had each an appraised book value, to with: the Sindhi, at P1,176.46, the Bhagnari at P1,320.56 and the Sahiniwal at P744.46. It was not stipulated that in case of loss of the bull due to fortuitous event the late husband of the appellant would be exempt from liability.

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Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Calma G.R. 160832

Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Calma

G.R. 160832

Facts

Case Background

o    The Governor General granted a homestead patent over a 20.9740-hectare parcel of land located in Tarlac.  On the basis of said patent, an Original Certificate of Title (OCT) was issued by the Register of Deeds. OCT was cancelled by a new TCT. Then, the new TCT was again cancelled by TCT under the names of the heirs of Calma. 

o    Fabian Calma died intestate. Lucia Calma was appointed as administratrix of the estate. The heirs executed a Deed of Partition over the property. 

o    Meanwhile, in 1967, said parcel of land located in Tarlac was declared for taxation purposes under the name of Emilio Santioque. However, the declaration did not bear the name and signature of the declarant.

o    Santioque died intestate.  His children filed a complaint in the RTC of Tarlac for declaration of nullity of title, reconveyance, with damages, over a piece of land situated in Tibag, Tarlac City.

o    The heirs claimed that Emilio was awarded Homestead Patent No. 18577 by virtue of Homestead Application No. 132104.OCT No. 1112 was issued to Emilio on April 21, 1932, and from then had enjoyed full ownership and dominion over the said lot.

o    The heirs of Calma filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging that (a) the action had prescribed and was barred by laches; (b) the claim has been abandoned, and (c) the complaint stated no cause of action. The court denied the motion.  The heirs of Calma filed their answer, reiterating the grounds and allegations in their motion to dismiss by way of special and affirmative defenses.

o    Felimon admitted that Amando Bangayan,  Chief, Records Management Division of the LMB certified that, based on the survey records of Cadastral Survey and as indicated in the Area Sheet Emilio Santioque was the claimant of the lot. However, the Bureau had no available records of Homestead Application No. 132104 and Homestead Patent.

o    The Register of Deeds issued a certification stating that despite diligent efforts, he could not locate OCT No. 1112 or any document showing how it was cancelled.

o    After the heirs of Santioque rested their case, the defendants, heirs of Calma, demurred to plaintiffs’ evidence and sought its dismissal on the ground that the latter failed to establish a preponderance of evidence to support their ownership over the property

Lower Court Rulings

·         RTC: issued an Order granting the demurrer and dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs failed to establish their case.

·         The heirs of Santioque appealed said order to the CA. They likewise wrote to the Director of NBI to investigate the disappearance of the copy of the Registrar of Deeds of Tarlac of OCT and TCT.

o    Without waiting for the report of the NBI on their request, the heirs of Santioque filed a motion with the CA for the early resolution of the case.

·         CA: affirmed the appealed decision. It did not give probative weight to the certifications and other documents submitted by the heirs of Santioque, as their authenticity had not been established and the signatories therein were not presented for cross-examination. It noted that none of the “crucial documents” were presented in the trial court.  

 Issues:

Procedural Issue:

·         Whether the trial court erred in granting the demurrer to evidence of respondents.

Substantial Issue

·         Whether petitioners’ claim is barred by prescription and laches.

Held and Ratio

Procedural Issue

·         No, the Court holds that CA ruling which affirmed that of the RTC granting the demurrer is correct.

o    Demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part as he would ordinarily have to do, if it is shown by plaintiff’s evidence that the latter is not entitled to the relief sought.

o    The demurrer, therefore, is an aid or instrument for the expeditious termination of an action, similar to a motion to dismiss, which a court or tribunal may either grant or deny.

o    A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Where the plaintiff’s evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to evidence should be sustained. 

o    A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting every proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his claim. It should be sustained where the plaintiff’s evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.

o    In the present case, petitioners failed to prove the material allegations in their complaint that Emilio Santioque applied for and was granted Patent No. 18577 and that OCT No. 1112 was issued on the basis thereof.

§  Petitioners rely on the tax documents to substantiate their claim over the subject property. However, it is axiomatic that tax receipts and tax declarations of ownership for taxation purposes do not constitute sufficient proof of ownership. They must be supported by other effective proofs.

Substantial Issue

·         Yes, the Court agrees with the appellate court that petitioners’ complaint is barred by prescription and laches.

o     An action for reconveyance prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property.

o     Even if we reckon the prescription period from TCT No. 19181 issued on November 27, 1953, the only title verified to be in the name of respondents, more than ten years have already elapsed since then until the time the petitioners filed their complaint on February 29, 1998.

o     An action for reconveyance is imprescriptible only when the plaintiff is in actual possession of the property. In the present case, there is no showing that petitioners were in actual possession of the subject property.

o     In any event, petitioners’ cause of action is likewise barred by laches. The essence of laches or “stale demands” is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus giving rise to the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.

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Gabeto v. Araneta G.R. No. L-15674

Gabeto v. Araneta 

[G.R. No. L-15674, October 17, 1921]

STREET, J.

Facts:

• Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata with a view to going to a cockpit. When the driver of the carromata had turned his horse and started in the direction indicated, the defendant, Agaton Araneta, stepped out into the street, stopped the horse, and at the same time protested to the driver that he himself had called this carromata first. 
• The driver, Julio Pagnaya, replied that he had not heard or seen the call of Araneta. Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the control of Agaton Araneta in order that the vehicle might pass on. 
• However, due to the looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the rottenness of the material of which it was made, the bit came out of the horse's mouth.
• Pagnaya, the driver, and Ilano, one of the passengers, had alighted from the carromata but Gayetano unfortunately retained his seat. 
• When Pagnaya was trying to fix the bridle, the horse, being free from the control of the bit, became disturbed and moved forward, in doing he was able to pull one of the wheels of the carromata up on the sidewalk; thus, strucking a police telephone box which was fixed to a post on the sidewalk, upon which the box came down with a crash and frightened the horse to such an extent that the horse set out at full speed up the street.
• After the runaway horse had proceeded up the street to a point in front of the Mission Hospital, Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, and in so doing received injuries from which he soon died.
• Consequently, the widow of Gayetano, Consolacion, filed an action for damages against Araneta. 

Issue: Whether Araneta should be held liable for the death of Gayetano.

Held: No. 

• The Court is of the opinion that the mere fact that the defendant interfered with the carromata by stopping the horse would not make him liable for the death of Proceso Gayetano.
• The stopping of the rig by Agaton Araneta in the middle of the street was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause thereof. 
• Moreover, by getting out and taking his post at the head of the horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the control of the animal, and the defendant cannot be charged with liability for the accident resulting from the action of the horse thereafter.
• The evidence indicates that the bridle was old, and the leather of which it was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken.
• Julio Pagnaya testifies to one fact which, if it were fully accredited, would possibly put a different complexion on the case; for he says that when the horse was pulled over to the curb, the defendant gesticulated with one of his arms and incidentally brought his hand down on the horse's nose. This, according to Pagnaya, is what made the horse run away. There is no other witness who testifies to this; and it is noteworthy that Basilio Ilano does not mention it. A decided preponderance of the evidence in our opinion is against it.

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Bataclan v. Medina G.R. No. L-10126

Bataclan v. Medina 

[G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957]

MONTEMAYOR, J.

Facts:

• At about 2:00am of September 13, 1952, the bus, operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina and driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite. While on its way to Pasay City, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle.
• Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus but the three passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. No evidence to show that the freed passengers, including the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped inside the vehicle.
• After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch, approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it. 
• That same day, the charred bodies of the four passengers inside the bus were removed and duly identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150.
• After trial, the CFI Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire. Both plaintiffs and defendants appealed the case to CA which endorsed the case to SC. 

Issue: W/N the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus or the fire that burned the bus, including the 4 passengers left inside. 

Held:

• The Court held that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus because when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected.
• The coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available. 
• In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. 
• Moreover, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through its driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus. 
• The leaked gasoline can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.
• In addition, the case involves a breach of contract of transportation because the Medina Transportation failed to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. There was likewise negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding and that the driver failed to changed the tires into new ones as instructed by Mariano Medina. 
• The driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions to insure the safety of his passengers. Had he changed the tires, specially those in front, with new ones, as he had been instructed to do, probably, despite his speeding, the blow out would not have occurred.

Ratio:

• Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
• Comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

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SAURA IMPORT and EXPERT CO., INC., vs DBP

SAURA IMPORT and EXPERT CO., INC., vs DBP 

[G.R. No. L-24968, April 27, 1972] 

MAKALINTAL, J.

FACTS:

• In July 1952, Saura, Inc., applied to Rehabilitation Finance Corp., now DBP, for an industrial loan of P500,000 to be used for the construction of a factory building, to pay the balance of the jute mill machinery and equipment and as additional working capital.  In Resolution No.145, the loan application was approved to be secured first by mortgage on the factory buildings, the land site, and machinery and equipment to be installed.
• The mortgage was registered and documents for the promissory note were executed. But then, later on, was cancelled to make way for the registration of a mortgage contract over the same property in favor of Prudential Bank and Trust Co., the latter having issued Saura letter of credit for the release of the jute machinery. As security, Saura execute a trust receipt in favor of the Prudential. For failure of Saura to pay said obligation, Prudential sued Saura.
• After almost 9 years, Saura Inc, commenced an action against RFC, alleging failure on the latter to comply with its obligations to release the loan applied for and approved, thereby preventing the plaintiff from completing or paying contractual commitments it had entered into, in connection with its jute mill project.
• The trial court ruled in favor of Saura, ruling that there was a perfected contract between the parties and that the RFC was guilty of breach thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a perfected contract between the parties. YES. There was indeed a perfected consensual contract.

HELD:

·Article 1934 provides: An accepted promise to deliver something by way of commodatum or simple loan is binding upon the parties, but the commodatum or simple loan itself shall not be perfected until delivery of the object of the contract.

· There was undoubtedly offer and acceptance in the case. The application of Saura, Inc. for a loan of P500,000.00 was approved by resolution of the defendant, and the corresponding mortgage was executed and registered. The defendant failed to fulfill its obligation and the plaintiff is therefore entitled to recover damages.

· When an application for a loan of money was approved by resolution of the respondent corporation and the responding mortgage was executed and registered, there arises a perfected consensual contract.

· However, it should be noted that RFC imposed two conditions (availability of raw materials and increased production) when it restored the loan to the original amount of P500,000.00.

· Saura, Inc. obviously was in no position to comply with RFC’s conditions. So instead of doing so and insisting that the loan be released as agreed upon, Saura, Inc. asked that the mortgage be cancelled.The action thus taken by both parties was in the nature of mutual desistance which is a mode of extinguishing obligations. It is a concept that derives from the principle that since mutual agreement can create a contract, mutual disagreement by the parties can cause its extinguishment.

·WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the complaint dismissed.

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Severino v Severino G.R. No. 34642

Severino v Severino 

[G.R. No. 34642, September 24, 1931] 

STREET, J.

FACTS:

• Melecio Severino upon his death, left considerable properties. To end litigation among heirs, a compromise was effected where defendant Guillermo (son of MS) took over the property of deceased and agreed to pay installment of 100K to plaintiff (wife of MS) payable first in 40K cash upon execution of document in 3 equal installments. Enrique Echauz became guarantor.
• Upon failure to pay the balance, plaintiff filed and action against the defendant and Echauz. Enchauz contends that he received nothing from affixing his signature in the document and the contract lacked the consideration as to him.

ISSUE: WON there is a consideration for the guaranty?

HELD:

• The proof shows that the money claimed in this action has never been paid and is still owing to the plaintiff; and the only defense worth noting in this decision is the assertion on the part of Enrique Echaus that he received nothing for affixing his signature as guarantor to the contract which is the subject of suit and that in effect the contract was lacking in consideration as to him.
• The guarantor or surety is bound by the same consideration that makes the contract effective between the principal parties thereto.
• The compromise and dismissal of a lawsuit is recognized in law as a valuable consideration; and the dismissal of the action which Felicitas Villanueva and Fabiola Severino had instituted against Guillermo Severino was an adequate consideration to support the promise on the part of Guillermo Severino to pay the sum of money stipulated in the contract which is the subject of this action. The promise of the appellant Echaus as guarantor therefore binding.
• It is neither necessary that guarantor or surety should receive any part of the benefit, if such there be accruing to his principal.
• Thus, judgment affirmed. 

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Castellvi de Higgins & Higgins vs. Sellner

Castellvi de Higgins & Higgins vs. Sellner [G.R. No. L-158025, November 5, 1920]

MALCOLM, J.

Facts:

• Sellner (defendant) wrote a letter to Mcleod (Castellvi’s agent) saying that he would bound himself to pay the promissory note of Mining, Clarke and Maye amounting 10K + interest if not fully paid at maturity, upon the surrender 3k shares of Keystone Mining Company. 
• Plaintiffs contend that he is a surety; defendant contends that he is a guarantor. Plaintiffs also admit that if defendant is a guarantor, articles 1830, 1831, and 1834 of the Civil Code govern.

Issue: WON Sellner is a guarantor or surety?

Held:

• Sellner is a GUARANTOR. The letter of Mr. Sellner recites that if the promissory note is not paid at maturity, then, within fifteen days after notice of such default and upon surrender to him of the three thousand shares of Keystone Mining Company stock, he will assume responsibility. 
• Sellner was not bound with Castellvi by the same instrument executed at the time and the same consideration, but his responsibility was secondary, one founded on an independent collateral agreement. Neither was he jointly and severally liable with Castellvi. 
• In the original Spanish of the Civil Code now in force in the Philippine Islands, Title XIV of Book IV is entitled "De la Fianza." The Spanish word "fianza" is translated in the Washington and Walton editions of the Civil Code as "security." "Fianza" appears in the Fisher translation as "suretyship." The Spanish world "fiador" is found in all of the English translations of the Civil Code as "surety." The law of guaranty is not related of by that name in the Civil Code, although indirect reference to the same is made in the Code of Commerce. In terminology at least, no distinction is made in the Civil Code between the obligation of a surety and that of a guarantor. 
• A surety and a guarantor are alike in that each promises to answer for the debt or default of another. A surety and a guarantor are unlike in that the surety assumes liability as a regular party to the undertaking, while the liability as a regular party to upon an independent agreement to pay the obligation if the primary pay or fails to do so. A surety is charged as an original promissory; the engagement of the guarantor is a collateral undertaking. The obligation of the surety is primary; the obligation of the guarantor is secondary. 
• The civil law suretyship is, accordingly, nearly synonymous with the common law guaranty; and the civil law relationship existing between codebtors liable in solidum is similar to the common law suretyship.

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Robert De Galicia vs. Mercado

Robert De Galicia vs. Mercado 

G.R. 146744

Facts

Case Background

·         Petitioner Robert G. de Galicia was a business partner in RCL Enterprises. He was asked by his partner Carmen Arciaga to co-sign with her a Philbank check for P50,000 payable to cash.

·         Allegedly without his knowledge and consent, Arciaga rediscounted the check with respondent Mely Mercado at 8% interest, thus, only the sum of P46,000 was given.

·         Checks were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Mercado then filed a complaint for estafa and for violation BP 221 against petitioner and Carmen Arciaga.

·         Petitioner countered by filing in the RTC Manila, a case for the declaration of nullity of the agreement to pay interest between respondent and his partner, Arciaga. He prayed that the agreement, together with the rediscounted check, be declared void for being contrary to public policy.

Lower Court Rulings

·         RTC: dismissed petitioner’s case for lack of jurisdiction. Motion for reconsideration was denied.

o    Arciaga, one of the parties in the so-called agreement, was not a party to the present case.

o    The subject check amounting to P50,000 was way below the jurisdictional amount vested in the Regional Trial Court.

·        Since this is a pure question of law, the petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the SC.

Issues:

Procedural Issue:

·         Whether RTC did not err in dismissing the complaint because Arciaga, as an indispensable party, was not impleaded;

Substantial Issue

·         Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over its subject matter simply because the amount involve was only P50,000.

Held and Ratio

Procedural Issue

·         Yes, this Court sustains the dismissal of the subject complaint for its failure to implead an indispensable party.

o    Under Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, an indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action.

o    The interests of such indispensable party in the subject matter of the suit and the relief are so bound with those of the other parties that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity; such that a complete and efficient determination of the equities and rights of the parties is not possible if he is not joined.

§  Arciaga, being a co-signatory of the re-discounted check and being privy to the assailed agreement, was an indispensable party to the suit. Her interest in the suit was intertwined with the rights and interest of both petitioner and respondent.

Substantial Issue

·         Yes, the subject of the action before the trial court was incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore cognizable by the RTC.

o    Under BP 129, the RTC shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

§  If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction lies in the municipal courts or in RTC depending on the amount involved.

§  However, if the issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, jurisdiction lies with the RTC.

In this case, what was being assailed was the payment of interest, not the recovery of a sum of money as found by the trial court.

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Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Calma

Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Calma

G.R. 160832

Facts

Case Background

o    The Governor General granted a homestead patent over a 20.9740-hectare parcel of land located in Tarlac.  On the basis of said patent, an Original Certificate of Title (OCT) was issued by the Register of Deeds. OCT was cancelled by a new TCT. Then, the new TCT was again cancelled by TCT under the names of the heirs of Calma. 

o    Fabian Calma died intestate. Lucia Calma was appointed as administratrix of the estate. The heirs executed a Deed of Partition over the property. 

o    Meanwhile, in 1967, said parcel of land located in Tarlac was declared for taxation purposes under the name of Emilio Santioque. However, the declaration did not bear the name and signature of the declarant.

o    Santioque died intestate.  His children filed a complaint in the RTC of Tarlac for declaration of nullity of title, reconveyance, with damages, over a piece of land situated in Tibag, Tarlac City.

o    The heirs claimed that Emilio was awarded Homestead Patent No. 18577 by virtue of Homestead Application No. 132104.OCT No. 1112 was issued to Emilio on April 21, 1932, and from then had enjoyed full ownership and dominion over the said lot.

o    The heirs of Calma filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging that (a) the action had prescribed and was barred by laches; (b) the claim has been abandoned, and (c) the complaint stated no cause of action. The court denied the motion.  The heirs of Calma filed their answer, reiterating the grounds and allegations in their motion to dismiss by way of special and affirmative defenses.

o    Felimon admitted that Amando Bangayan,  Chief, Records Management Division of the LMB certified that, based on the survey records of Cadastral Survey and as indicated in the Area Sheet Emilio Santioque was the claimant of the lot. However, the Bureau had no available records of Homestead Application No. 132104 and Homestead Patent.

o    The Register of Deeds issued a certification stating that despite diligent efforts, he could not locate OCT No. 1112 or any document showing how it was cancelled.

o    After the heirs of Santioque rested their case, the defendants, heirs of Calma, demurred to plaintiffs’ evidence and sought its dismissal on the ground that the latter failed to establish a preponderance of evidence to support their ownership over the property

Lower Court Rulings

·         RTC: issued an Order granting the demurrer and dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs failed to establish their case.

·         The heirs of Santioque appealed said order to the CA. They likewise wrote to the Director of NBI to investigate the disappearance of the copy of the Registrar of Deeds of Tarlac of OCT and TCT.

o    Without waiting for the report of the NBI on their request, the heirs of Santioque filed a motion with the CA for the early resolution of the case.

·         CA: affirmed the appealed decision. It did not give probative weight to the certifications and other documents submitted by the heirs of Santioque, as their authenticity had not been established and the signatories therein were not presented for cross-examination. It noted that none of the “crucial documents” were presented in the trial court.  

 Issues:

Procedural Issue:

·         Whether the trial court erred in granting the demurrer to evidence of respondents.

Substantial Issue

·         Whether petitioners’ claim is barred by prescription and laches.

Held and Ratio

Procedural Issue

·         No, the Court holds that CA ruling which affirmed that of the RTC granting the demurrer is correct.

o    Demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part as he would ordinarily have to do, if it is shown by plaintiff’s evidence that the latter is not entitled to the relief sought.

o    The demurrer, therefore, is an aid or instrument for the expeditious termination of an action, similar to a motion to dismiss, which a court or tribunal may either grant or deny.

o    A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Where the plaintiff’s evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to evidence should be sustained. 

o    A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting every proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his claim. It should be sustained where the plaintiff’s evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.

o    In the present case, petitioners failed to prove the material allegations in their complaint that Emilio Santioque applied for and was granted Patent No. 18577 and that OCT No. 1112 was issued on the basis thereof.

§  Petitioners rely on the tax documents to substantiate their claim over the subject property. However, it is axiomatic that tax receipts and tax declarations of ownership for taxation purposes do not constitute sufficient proof of ownership. They must be supported by other effective proofs.

Substantial Issue

·         Yes, the Court agrees with the appellate court that petitioners’ complaint is barred by prescription and laches.

o     An action for reconveyance prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property.

o     Even if we reckon the prescription period from TCT No. 19181 issued on November 27, 1953, the only title verified to be in the name of respondents, more than ten years have already elapsed since then until the time the petitioners filed their complaint on February 29, 1998.

o     An action for reconveyance is imprescriptible only when the plaintiff is in actual possession of the property. In the present case, there is no showing that petitioners were in actual possession of the subject property.

o     In any event, petitioners’ cause of action is likewise barred by laches. The essence of laches or “stale demands” is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus giving rise to the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.

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