Teves vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180363, April 28, 2009

G.R. No. 180363, April 28, 2009

EDGAR Y. TEVES, Petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERMINIO G. TEVES

Facts:

·         Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district of Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections.

·         Respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that in Teves v. Sandiganbayan,3 he was convicted of violating Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991.

·         Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office.

·         The COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for the position of member of House of Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy.

·         Upon MR, COMELEC en banc denied the motion saying that since petitioner lost in the last 14 May 2007 congressional elections, it thereby rendered the instant MR moot and academic.

Issue: Whether petitioner’s violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral turpitude.

Held:

·         Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.

·         The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The accused is a public officer; 2) he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; 3) he either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by law.

·         Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The first mode is when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction. The second mode is when he is prohibited from having such an interest by the Constitution or by law.

·         In Teves v. Sandiganbayan, petitioner was convicted under the second mode for having pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit which is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local Government Code of 1991.

o   The evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in question.

o   Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his wife, still he would have a direct interest thereon because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such their property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

o   Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and is, therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991.

·         However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same involved moral turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of the statute must be considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited, as in the instant case.

·         The Court clarified that not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that "as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine." In resolving the foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not.

·         Moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude.

·         Consequently, considering all circumstances, the Court held that petitioner’s conviction does not involve moral turpitude.

·         The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit.

·         In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse.