Facts:
Private respondent, Cristito Mata,
filed a complaint against petitioner with the Municipal Court – Davao del Sur
for the collection of damages and attorney's fees. After trial, judgment was
rendered in favor of the private respondent and against the herein petitioner.
A copy of the decision was received by
the petitioner on 8 June 1977, and the following day, 9 June 1977, he filed a
notice of appeal with the said municipal court, and on 24 June 1977, he
completed the other requirements for the perfection of an appeal, including the
filing of an appeal bond and the payment of the appellate court docket fee.
However, when the case was elevated to
the CFI-Davao del Sur for the consideration of the appeal, the presiding judge
thereof ruled that the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period;
consequently, he dismissed the appeal.
Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari, mandamus with preliminary injunction with the CA, claiming that
from 8 June 1977, when he received a copy of the decision of the municipal
court, to 24 June 1977, when he perfected his appeal, only fifteen (15) days
had elapsed so that the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao del
Sur, dismissing his appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary
period, is erroneous and contrary to law.
The petitioner contended that the
computation of the period to appeal should commence on the hour he received
copy of the decision, so that the first of the 1 5-day period comprising 24
hours is from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 9 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 10 June
1977 and the last day, from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 23 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock
p.m. of 24 June 1977.
The Court of Appeals, however, rejected
his interpretation as it would result in many confusing situations and many unreliable
testimonies as to the time a copy of a decision, order or pleading is received.
It held that when a law was to be effective upon approval by the President and
the President signed the same on 16 June 1950, the law should be considered to
have taken effect not on the exact hour when the President signed the same on
16 June 1950 but from the very first minute or hour of said day of 16 June
1950.
Issue: W/N the
court should take into consideration the exact hour when a pleading, order or
decision is received by a party for the computation of the period to appeal.
Ruling: (Direct Answer to Issue)
No. The Court
found no merit in the petition.
Ratio:
The rule stated in Article 13 of the Civil Code to the
effect that "In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and
the last day included" is similar, but not Identical to Section 4 of the
Code of Civil Procedure which provided that "Unless otherwise specially
provided, the time within which an act is required by law to be
done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last; and
if the last be Sunday or a legal holiday it shall be excluded", as well as
the old Rule 28 of the Rules of Court which stated that "In computing any
period of time prescribed or allowed by the Rules of Court, by order of a
court, or by any other applicable statute, the day of the act, event or default
after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included.
The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a Sunday
or a legal holiday, in which event the time shall run until the end of the next
day which is neither a Sunday or a legal holiday." In applying this rule,
the Court considered the day as synonymous with the date.
Petitioner's suggestion, however, may find application in
appeals in habeas corpus cases where the law requires that such appeals should
be made within 48 hours from notice of judgment.
The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
period laid down by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and in the
absence of any justifying circumstance, the court has no jurisdiction to
approve or admit an appeal filed out of time. In the instant case, the
petitioner failed to prove, or even claim, that his failure to appeal on time
was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED.
