Siga v Cercado Jr G.R. No. 185374, March 11, 2015

Facts:
In their Complaint, petitioners Simplicia Cercado-Siga (Simplicia) and Ligaya Cercado-Belison (Ligaya) claimed that they are the legitimate children of the late Vicente and Benita Castillo (Benita), who were married last 9 October 1929 in Pililla, Rizal. In support of the existence thereof, petitioners presented a copy of the Contrato Matrimonial which was issued by Iglesia Filipina Independiente church. Petitioners insist that the Contrato Matrimonial is a public document because it is required by law to be recorded in the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office (NSO). Petitioners claim to have in their possession a duplicate original of the Contrato Matrimonial which should be regarded as original. Granting that the Contrato Matrimonial is a private document, petitioners maintain that said document should be considered an ancient document which should be excluded from the requirement of authentication.

In their Answer, respondents alleged that they are the legitimate heirs of Vicente and Leonora, who were married on 27 June 1977 as evidenced by a marriage certificate registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Binangonan, Rizal. In their Comment, respondents submit that the Contrato Matrimonial is a private document and the fact that marriages are required to be registered in the local civil registrar does not ipso facto make it a public document. Respondents assert that the certificate of baptism is likewise a private document which tends to prove only the administration of the sacrament of baptism and not the veracity of the declarations therein. Respondents moreover refute the certification issued by the local civil registry arguing that it does not prove filiation but only the fact that there is no record of Ligaya on file with said office.

RTC upheld the validity of the marriage between Vicente and Benita and considered the subsequent marriage between Vicente and Leonora as void and bigamous before it concluded that the subject property was part of the conjugal property of Vicente and Benita. Consequently, the trial court held that the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate (Deed) executed and signed by respondents is null and void because it deprived Benita of her share of the property as surviving spouse and impaired the shares and legitimes of petitioners. Thus, it ruled that petitioners are entitled to recover their share in the subject property.

CA ruled that the trial court "can pass upon the issue of the validity of marriage of Vicente and Leonora [because] no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity and the court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same, as long as it is essential to the determination of the case before it." However, the appellate court found that the Contrato Matrimonial of Vicente and Benita, being a private document, was not properly authenticated, hence, not admissible in evidence. Moreover, the appellate court did not consider the baptismal certificate submitted by petitioners as conclusive proof of filiation. The Joint Affidavit executed by a certain Mario Casale and Balas Chimlangco attesting to the birth of Ligaya to Vicente and Benita was not given credence by the appellate court for being a hearsay evidence. For failure of petitioners to prove their cause of action by preponderance of evidence, the appellate court reversed and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the RTC.

Issue: Whether the marriage contract or Contrato Matrimonial is sufficient to prove the fact of marriage between Vicente and Benita.

Ruling: No. Petition is DENIED.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that it is a private document. As early as in the case of U.S. v. Evangelista,22 it has been settled that church registries of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials. They are private writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other private writings in accordance with the rules of evidence.

Petitioners insist on the admissibility of the marriage contract on the ground that it is a duplicate original, hence, the original need not be produced. The Court do not agree. The Court had previously ruled in Vallarta v. Court of Appeals that " a signed carbon copy or duplicate of a document executed at the same time as the original is known as a duplicate original and maybe introduced in evidence without accounting for the non- production of the original. But, an unsigned and uncertified document purporting to be a carbon copy is not competent evidence. It is because there is no public officer acknowledging the accuracy of the copy."

On the other hand, the document presented to prove Ligaya’s kinship is a Joint Affidavit executed by two persons to the effect that she was born to Vicente and Benita. These two affiants were never presented in court. Thus, their statement is tantamount to hearsay evidence.

Petitioners also presented certifications from the local civil registrar certifying that the records of birth from 1930 to 1946 were destroyed by fire and/or war. In said documents, there contains an advice that petitioners may make a further verification with the NSO because the local civil registrar submits a copy of the birth certificate of every registered birth with the NSO. The advice was not heeded. Petitioners failed to present a certification from NSO whether such records do exist or not.

Considering that petitioners failed to prove the validity of the marriage between Vicente and Benita, it follows that they do not have a cause of action in the case for the declaration of nullity of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Vicente and Leonora.

Ratio:
Ancient documents are considered from proper custody if they come from a place from which they might reasonably be expected to be found. Custody is proper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin or if the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable. If a document is found where it would not properly and naturally be, its absence from the proper place must be satisfactorily accounted for.

Read More

Vitangcol v People G.R. No. 207406, January 13, 2016

Doctrine:
Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their first marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage without the judicial declaration, they are guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of the nullity of the first marriage.


Facts:
On December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo (Alice). Born into their union were three (3) children. After some time, Alice eventually discovered that Norberto was previously married to a certain Gina M. Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17, 1987, as evidenced by a marriage contract registered with the National Statistics Office. Alice subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for bigamy against Norberto.

Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case. He presents as evidence a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that the Office has no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and his first wife, Gina. He argues that with no proof of existence of an essential requisite of marriage—the marriage license—the prosecution fails to establish the legality of his first marriage. In addition, Norberto claims that the legal dissolution of the first marriage is not an element of the crime of bigamy.

Issue: Whether the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license issued to petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol and his first wife Gina proves the nullity of petitioner’s first marriage and exculpates him from the bigamy charge.

Ruling: No. Petition for Certiorari is DENIED.

The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license is suspect. Assuming that it is true, it does not categorically prove that there was no marriage license. Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved through mere certifications by the civil registrar. For more than seven (7) years before his second marriage, petitioner did nothing to have his alleged spurious first marriage declared a nullity. Even when this case was pending, he did not present any decision from any trial court nullifying his first marriage.

Ratio:
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. Petitioner was still legally married to Gina when he married Alice. Thus, the trial court correctly convicted him of the crime charged.

Read More

Castillo v Castillo G.R. No. 189607, April 18, 2016

Facts:

On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6 January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato).

On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista. Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended that her marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged.

RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The lower court dismissed Lea's argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could presume the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, RTC also said that even if respondent eventually had her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first and second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to Bautista before contracting her second marriage with Renato.

CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order and upheld the validity of the parties' marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the law in effect at the time the marriages were celebrated, and not the Family Code. Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.


Issue: W/N judicial declaration is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.


Ruling: NO, under the Civil Code. Petition is DENIED.

The Court held that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.


Ratio:

The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration. In this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. The children of the parties were also born while the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80, 81, 82, and 83 (first paragraph); and those on voidable marriages are Articles 83 (second paragraph), 85 and 86.

Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following ways:
1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until annulled by a competent court;
2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by cohabitation;
3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot be collaterally attacked;
4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural children by legal fiction, while in voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived before the decree of annulment are considered legitimate; and
5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary," while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree.

Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases of People v. Mendoza, People v. Aragon, and Odayat v. Amante, that the Civil Code contains no express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage.

It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the rulings in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriages celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly required where the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage. A second marriage contracted prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus considered bigamous and void.

Read More

Republic v Tampus G.R. No. 214243, March 16, 2016

Facts:

Respondent Nilda was married to Dante on November 29, 1975 in Cordova, Cebu. The marriage ceremony was solemnized by Municipal Judge Julian B. Pogoy of Cordova, Cebu. Three days thereafter, or on December 2, 1975, Dante, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), left respondent, and went to Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. The couple had no children.

Since then, Nilda heard no news from Dante. She tried everything to locate· him, but her efforts proved futile. Thus, on April 14, 2009, she filed before the RTC a petition to declare Dante as presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage, alleging that after the lapse of thirty-three (33) years without any kind of communication from him, she firmly believes that he is already dead.

RTC granted Nilda's petition. It found that Dante left the conjugal dwelling sometime in 1975 and from then on, Nilda never heard from him again despite diligent efforts to locate him. In this light, she believes that he had passed away especially since his last assignment was a combat mission. Moreover, the RTC found that the absence of thirty-three (33) years was sufficient to give rise to the presumption of death. CA affirmed the RTC Decision.

Issue: Whether Dante has been correctly declared as presumptively dead.

Ruling: No.

In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried to locate him by making inquiries with his parents, relatives, and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did not know where to find him. Other than making said inquiries, however, Nilda made no further efforts to find her husband. She could have called or proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request information about her husband, but failed to do so. She did not even seek the help of the authorities or the AFP itself in finding him. She could have inquired from the AFP on the status of the said mission, or from the members of the AFP who were assigned thereto.

To the Court's mind, therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for her missing husband, and her purported earnest efforts to find him by asking Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy the strict standard and degree of diligence required to create a "well-founded belief' of his death.

Furthermore, Nilda did not present Dante's family, relatives, or neighbors as witnesses who could have corroborated her asseverations that she earnestly looked for Dante. These resource persons were not even named.

Finally, other than Nilda's bare testimony, no other corroborative evidence had been offered to support her allegation that she exerted efforts to find him but was unsuccessful. What appears from the facts as. established in this case was that Nilda simply allowed the passage of time without actively and diligently searching for her husband, which the Court cannot accept as constituting a "well-founded belief' that her husband is dead.

Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by the present spouse.

Ratio:

Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had  been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead.

Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:

1)    that the absent spouse has been missing for four (4) consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code;

2)    that the present spouse wishes to remarry;

3)    that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and

4)    (4) that the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the foregoing requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code exist. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.

The "well-founded belief' in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one. As such, the mere absence of the spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack of any news that such absentee spouse is still alive, failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.

Read More